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Abstract: The paper discusses an educational case 
study of protocol modelling in TURTLE, a real-time 
UML profile supported by the open source toolkit 
TTool. The method associated with TURTLE is step 
by step illustrated with the connection set up and 
handover procedures defined for the Future Air 
navigation Systems. The paper covers the following 
methodological stages: requirement modeling, use-
case driven and scenario based analysis, object-
oriented design and rapid prototyping in Java. 
Emphasis is laid on the formal verification of analysis 
and design diagrams. 
Keywords: Real-Time UML, requirements, analysis, 
design, deployment, formal verification, code 
generation. 
1. Introduction 
A UML profile customizes the Unified Modeling 
Language [1] for specific needs. A profile definition 
usually adds formality to the OMG-based notation 
and stimulates tool development. Like UML, a profile 
needs to be associated with a method. To convince 
practitioners that a UML profile, a tool and a method 
meet their needs, it is important to develop teaching 
material and to make case studies publicly available. 
 
The remark particularly applies to TURTLE [2], the 
real-time UML profile supported by the open-source 
toolkit TTool [3]. Therefore, the paper discusses an 
educational case-study of protocol modeling using 
TTool, its diagram editors, its formal code generators 
and interfaces to formal verification tools, as well as 
its Java code generator. The case study which serves 
as running example throughout the paper is a subset 
of the Future Air Navigation System [4]. The 
connection set up and handover procedures included 
in the FANS specification document support an 
explicit description of the TURTLE method, from 
requirement elicitation to rapid prototyping in Java. 
The paper particularly points out the benefits of using 
TTool with formal verification tools [5] [6] [7] and 
insists on the user-friendliness of the interface TTool 
offers for linking UML-based modeling and formal 
verification. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents 
the TURTLE language, the toolkit and the method. 
Section 3 introduces the FANS. Section 4, 5, 6 and 7 
respectively address the requirements, analysis, 
design and deployment stages of the TURTLE 
method. Section 8 concludes the paper. 
2. TURTLE 
2.1 Methodology 
 
The TURTLE language reuses and extends SysML 
and UML diagrams. TURTLE requirement diagrams 
are based on the SysML syntax [8], whereas use-
case, sequence, class, objects and activity diagrams 
reuse the UML 2 syntax [1]. 
1. Requirement capture. A SysML-like 
Requirement Diagram captures informal 
requirements. Chronograms add formality to 
temporal requirements. That formality enables 
formal verification of analysis and design 
diagrams against temporal requirements [9]. 
2. Analysis. A use-case diagram separates the 
system from external actors and identifies the 
functions and services offered by the system. 
Use-cases are documented by scenarios 
expressed in terms of sequence diagrams. 
Scenario instances communicate asynchronously 
or synchronously and the lifeline of one instance 
may contain absolute dates, time intervals and 
timers. An Interaction Overview Diagram (IOD) 
structures the sequence diagrams in a flow-chart 
fashion, which enhances modeling capabilities at 
analysis level. Formal code (e.g. in RT-LOTOS 
and UPPAAL) may be generated from a set of 
IODs and sequence diagrams, which enables 
formal verification of analysis diagrams before 
design diagrams are created.  
3. Design. In terms of architecture, a class/object 
diagram defines the system as a set of typed 
objects, and explicitly composes pairs of objects 
that run in parallel, run in sequence, rendezvous, 
or preempt each other. Their behaviors are 
described by activity diagrams that support 
 synchronization actions and time intervals. 
Additionally, TURTLE activity diagrams offer non 
deterministic operators to describe time 
behaviors and reactivity to environment. 
4. Deployment. The software classes identified 
during the design step are grouped into 
components. A component diagram is created. 
Components may be deployed over execution 
nodes using UML deployment diagrams.  
 
2.2 TTool 
 
The TURTLE toolkit, or TTool for short, belongs to 
the category of UML front-ends that include code 
generators for external verification tools, as well as 
for rapid prototyping. TTool offers user-friendly 
interfaces to formal verification tools and nicely 
manages the problem of linking verification results to 
the identifiers used in the TURTLE model. People 
with limited knowledge of formal methods may use 
TTool without reading a line of LOTOS [10], RT-
LOTOS [11], or UPPAAL code [12]. The press-button 
approach implemented for the verification-oriented 
code generators has been reused for the Java code 
generator intended for prototyping. 
• TTool includes several code generators that 
enable application of complementary verification 
techniques, such as model-checking, transition 
system minimization and observers. 
• All diagrams, but the use-case diagram and the 
informal part of requirement diagrams, have a 
formal semantics. Therefore, formal verification 
applies not only to design diagrams but also to 
analysis and deployment ones. TTool thus 
enables to apply formal verification to analysis 
diagrams where other UML tools apply it to 
design diagrams exclusively. Knowledge of 
object-oriented design is therefore not an asset 
for using TTool. For instance, formal verification 
may be achieved on scenario-based analysis. 
• TTool bridges the gap between the analysis 
and design steps. Indeed, it includes a design 
diagram synthesizer which takes sequence 
diagrams as input and outputs objects and 
activity diagrams. Automatically generated design 
diagrams may be extended manually and 
formally verified. 
 
3. Case Study: the FANS  
The Future Air Navigation System, or FANS for short, 
is a highly complex system. An excerpt of its 
specification document was selected for its capacity 
to convey an intuition of the importance of carefully 
working on specification documents before starting a 
TURTLE model, as well as for its capacity to illustrate 
the TURTLE method in a reasonable time. 
 
The objective of the paper is not to describe the 
entire FANS system but to exemplify the TURTLE 
approach on two procedures: the Initial Notification 
(IN) and the Request For Notification (RFN). IN is a 
connection set up procedure which authenticates an 
aircraft to an Air Traffic Control Center (control 
tower). RFN is as a handover procedure: an aircraft 
connected to a tower T1 sets up a connection to 
another tower T2 and releases its connection to T1.  
 
The case study is educational. Nevertheless, the 
starting point of the study is not a text formatted by 
professors but an industry document in plain English 
that incompletely and sometimes ambiguously 
describes the IN and RFN procedures. The original 
text thus needs to be carefully analyzed in terms of 
incompleteness, ambiguities and contradictions. The 
purpose is not only to detect defaults but also to take 
decisions. The output of that clarification process is a 
specification document which served as input to 
elaborate the TURTLE model presented in the rest of 
the paper. The clarification process is not detailed in 
the paper in order to leave space for a discussion on 
the use of TURTLE. 
4. Requirements  
Discussion in the paper focuses on two requirements 
attached with the IN and RFN procedures. 
• Req1: The IN procedure either completes within 
10 minutes or aborts. The pilot accordingly 
receives a “success” or “abortion” report. 
• Req2: The RFN procedure either completes 
within 25 seconds or aborts. The pilot accordingly 
receives a “success” or “abortion” report. 
Assuming, the aircraft was originally connected to 
ATC1 and moves to an area controlled by ATC2, 
then ATC1 receives a message indicating 
whether RFN completed or not. 
 
The SysML requirement diagram depicted in Figure 1 
contains Req1 and Req2, two requirement nodes 
stereotyped by <<Requirement>>. Each first-level 
requirement contains three sub-requirements (see 
the containment relationship). The leftmost sub-
requirements deal with success and error messages. 
The other sub-requirements associate a time 
constraint related to the first-level requirement. 
5. Analysis  
5.1 Modeling 
The use case diagram contains two main functions 
(see Figure 2): InitialNotification (IN) and RequestFor 
Notification (RFN). One may observe that RFN 
includes IN (see the <<include>> relation). Both IN 
and RFN use a timer service. For simplicity, the use 
case diagram contains human actors (FlightCrew and 
AirTrafficController) and not hardware ones. The 
diagram further omits maintenance operations. The 
boot and power off of the system are also ignored. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Use-case diagram  
 
Scenarios expressed by sequence diagrams 
contribute to better understanding of how the system 
will work. A scenario describes execution traces that 
document a function or a service modeled by one or 
several use cases. Scenarios are usually categorized 
into two groups that distinguish between nominal 
behavior and error situations, respectively. In 
TURTLE, an Interaction Overview Diagram (IOD) 
allows one to structure the scenarios in a flow chart 
fashion. In practice, an IOD looks like an activity 
diagram where actions have been replaced with 
references to sequence diagram names. 
 
The IN procedure is not complex, which explains why 
all the traces may be modeled by an easy-to-read 
IOD and simple sequence diagrams. The RFN 
procedure is far more complex and the entire IOD 
would have around 50 nodes. Consequently, the 
model of the RFN discussed hereby assumes no 
message but Contact_Advisory may be lost. 
 
The IOD associated with the IN function is depicted in 
Figure 3. It includes the following scenarios:  
1. IN_Init: the fight crew sends a 
“startInitialNotification” message to the 
aircraft, and the latter sets its retransmission 
counter to 3. 
2. IN_SendNotification: the aircraft sends a 
“Notification Contact” to the communication 
medium, and sets the ATST1 timer. 
3. IN_CommunicationDelay: a communication 
non-deterministic delay is applied to the 
messages transiting through the 
communication medium. 
4. IN_NotificationTransmitted: the communic-
ation medium forwards a notification 
message to an Air Traffic Controller (ATC), 
i.e. to a tower. The scenario uses a non-
deterministic delay to model the computation 
time the ATC takes to issue the notification, 
and follows up sending an acknowledgement 
(AFN_ACK) to the communication medium. 
 
Figure 1. Requirement Diagram 
  
 
Figure 3. Interaction Overview Diagram 
 
5. IN_MessageLoss describes an error 
situation: the communication medium has lost 
a message. 
6. IN_ATST1Expires: the aircraft did not receive 
any acknowledgment on time; the ATST1 
timer expires and the retransmission counter 
is decreased by 1. 
7. IN_ACKTransmitted: the acknowledgement is 
forwarded from the communication medium 
to the Aircraft. The Aircraft resets its timer, 
and sends an IN_Success message to the 
crew (see Figure 4) 
8. IN_Failed: the aircraft notifies the crew with a 
failure message. 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Initial Notification, IN_ACKTransmitted 
scenario 
 
 
 
The seven scenarios associated with IN are 
structured by an IOD. Scenarios 1, 2, 3 are executed 
in sequence. Then, a notification may be correctly 
transmitted (scenario 4) or lost (scenario 5). When 
the notification is correctly transmitted, a response is 
sent to the Aircraft (scenario 3). The IN procedure 
completes if the response is correctly transmitted 
(scenario 7). Otherwise the response is lost (scenario 
5); the ATST1 timer expires (scenario 6) and the 
counter of the Aircraft is decreased by 1. If the 
counter equals 0, the IN procedure fails (scenario 8). 
Otherwise, the Aircraft retransmits a notification to the 
ATC. 
 
The IOD associated with the RFN procedure is far 
more complex. The number of messages increases 
and so does the number of potential messages 
losses. Given the difficulty to model all possible 
traces using scenarios, the IOD associated with RFN 
considers that no message may be lost, but the 
ContactAdvisory message sent from ATC1 to the 
Aircraft (Figure 5). 
RFN is modeled as the interconnection of five 
scenarios: 
1. RFN_Init: initialization of a counter in ATC1 
(no more than three retransmissions in case 
of message loss). 
2. RFN_ContactAdvisory: ATC1 transmits the 
Contact_Advisory message to the Aircraft. 
3. RFN_LossOfContactAdvisory: the message 
named Contact_Advisory is lost during its 
transfer through the communication medium. 
4. RFN_Failed: the failure of the overall RFN 
procedure is notified to the controller. 
5. RFN_NoLoss: the RFN procedure is 
successful (see Figure 6). 
 
 
Figure 5. Request For Notification – Excerpt of the 
Interaction Overview Diagram 
  
 
Figure 6. Request For Notification – RFN_NoLoss 
scenario 
 
5.2 Verification 
 
An IOD and all the sequence diagrams it references 
serve as starting point to generate a formal 
specification in  RT-LOTOS, LOTOS or UPPAAL. The 
RTL verification tool developed for RT-LOTOS 
generates a reachability graph (rg1) with 51 states 
and 82 transitions for the IN procedure. The graph 
rg2 generated for the RFN procedure has 359 states 
and 539 transitions. Formal analysis of the two 
graphs draws the following conclusions: 
• Req1: the only deadlock states of rg1 are the 
states whose leading transition is either 
IN_Success or IN_Failed. This may be 
verified by minimizing rg1 with respect to 
startInitialNotification, IN_Success and 
IN_Failed (Figure 7). 
• The IPN_AbortionReport requirement can be 
proved the same way. 
• The IPN_TimeConstraint requirement is 
proved in a different way. A graph with timing 
information (a “DTA” [11]) is generated. 
Timing information enables to deduce at what 
time the actions contained in the sequence 
diagrams may be performed.  Another way to 
do this is to use an observer, a technique 
exemplified later on in the paper (for design 
diagrams). 
Using graph generation and minimization techniques, 
Req2 has been also proved to be satisfied by the 
RFN procedure. 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Quotient automaton – Formal verification of 
analysis diagrams, IN procedure 
6. Design  
6.1 Design generation 
A first version of the architecture and behaviours of 
the system have been obtained using TTool’s 
automatic design synthesizer. The latter took as input 
the IOD and the sequence diagrams referenced by 
that IOD (see section 5). The object diagram and 
activity diagrams output by the design synthesizer do 
not represent the entire system. The architecture is 
built upon analysis instances, and thus results from 
an automated procedure, not from an experience the 
designer may have in object-oriented design. The 
main advantage of using the design synthesizer is to 
propose a seamless transition from analysis to design 
and to limit copy/paste errors. 
The synthesized design needs to be enhanced with 
architecture information. Examples include functions 
organized into classes, messages parameterized with 
more complex data structures, and explicit modeling 
of routing inside the communication medium making 
the notion of sending and receiving entity appear. 
 
Our analysis model contains two IODs: one for IN, 
one for RFN. Given the design synthesizer accepts 
one IOD as input, we have to compare the pros and 
cons of two options: 
• Generating a design from the IOD of IN. 
The advantage is that the analysis diagrams 
of IN model all possible traces, including 
message losses. The design generated from 
IN nevertheless needs to be enhanced with 
the RFN functions. 
• Generating a design from the IOD of RFN. 
The advantage is that the analysis diagrams 
of RFN also contain a model of IN, since IN is 
a subpart of RFN. Unfortunately, the analysis 
models of RFN do not model all message 
losses. 
Let us consider the design generated 
option. It contains five classes that one by one 
correspond to an entity identified during the analysis 
stage. The entities are: Timer__ATST1
CommunicationMedium, FlightCrew and 
These classes rendezvous on synchronization gates
The gates’ names match the names of the 
exchanged by the entities in sequence diagrams
 
6.2 Reworking the design 
 
The architecture and behavioral diagrams 
synthesized by TTool serve as reference for a 
manually improved class diagram: 
• A Timer class taken from the generated 
design is instantiated twice by two TObjects
ATST1:Timer and ATST2_ATST3:Timer
• A class named AircraftEmbeddedSystem
models the embedded system of the Aircraft
entity identified at analysis step. The name 
change helps identifying the targeted system
• A class CommunicationMedium 
communication medium which links the two 
control towers and the aircraft. The message 
no longer transmits untyped messages, but 
TData which is a class modeling a data 
structure with several fields: a message
source address, a destination address and a 
data field. Examples of IDs include 
Contact_Advisory and Response.
• A class ATCEmbeddedSystem is
twice (ATC1, ATC2) to model 
handover between two towers. 
• An Environment class models all 
interactions between the system and its 
environment. Environment gathers the 
behavior of the flight crew and the controllers.
The architecture is verification-centric.
 
The design generator not only constructs the 
architecture of the system but also provides 
behavior to the classes. The activity diagrams 
associated with the classes are revisited.
example, the messages identified by their names in 
sequences diagrams are now modeled as Protocol 
Data Units. Also, the Air Tower Control is a generic 
class that models the three roles described in the 
FANS: the role played in the IN procedure, and the 
two roles that an ATC can play in the RFN: an 
the origin of a handover or an ATC at the destination 
of the handover. 
 
6.3 Formal verification 
Formal verification combines the observer technique 
with graph minimization and model
techniques. Req1_Observer verifies 
Notification procedure completes within 10
Req1_Observer generates an IN_DONE
case of successful termination and an 
for the first 
, Aircraft, 
ATC1. 
. 
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. 
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Figure 8. Activity Diagram – Excerpt with a mark for 
reachability accessibility
 
 
Req1 and Req2 were verified using two 
complementary tools: RTL and UPPAAL.
 
The screenshot in Figure 9 
verification of Req1 and Req2 
reachability graph generated by RTL
and 20000 transitions. Without reading a line of RT
LOTOS code or scanning the file containing the 
graph, the user of TTool uses
provided by TTool’s interface to prove that none
the graph’s transition is labeled by
 
 
Figure 9. Reachability graph 
 
Formal verification draws to the conclusion
and the RFN procedures respectively completes
within 10 and 25 seconds after being triggered by the 
the RFN 
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error 
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in Figure 8. 
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 pilot. This does not suffice to prove that the system is 
not in an infinite 0-time loop (a situation where 
actions can be performed infinitely whilst time does 
not evolve). To prove the two procedures, once 
started, always reach a termination state, the 
reachability graph may be minimized with respect to 
the actions of the Environment. Figure 10 depicts the 
quotient automaton generated by a minimization 
algorithm, using the relation defined in [13]. The 
system always performs an “IN_DONE” (i.e. there is 
no infinite loop in IN). Also, each time an RFN_Begin 
action is performed, the system eventually performs 
an RFN_DONE action (i.e., there is not infinite loop in 
RFN). We thus come to the conclusion that Req1 and 
Req2 are proved. 
 
 
 
Figure 10. Quotient automaton – Formal verification 
of design diagrams 
 
Req1 and Req2 may also be proved using UPPAAL. 
TTool makes it possible to directly enter model-
checking formulas that are transparently checked by 
UPPAAL in the sense that only the result is displayed 
to the user of TTool. Also, one right click on an action 
of an activity diagram (In Figure 8, see the red cross 
on the “error” action) suffices to directly check for the 
accessibility and liveness of that action. Again 
UPPAAL is transparently used. 
 
Proof of Req1 and Req2 with UPPAAL includes the 
following intermediate proofs: 
• The IN_Done action is always accessible 
(liveness). 
• The RFN_Begin action is reachable. 
• None of error actions is reachable, which 
means that both procedures are completed 
within their required deadlines (10 seconds 
for IN, 25 seconds for RFN) temporal 
specification. 
• The following formula – translated in CTL - is 
satisfied: “either the IN fails or succeeds. If it 
succeeds, the RFN is started and always 
completes” (see on Figure 11, “Custom 
formulae”). 
 
 
  
Figure 11. Formal Verification of Req1 and Req2 
using the TTool interface for UPPAAL 
7. Deployment 
 
The deployment phase consists in mapping “software 
components” on execution nodes, and generating 
prototyping code to test the system in more realistic 
conditions. In TURTLE, software components are 
usually built upon classes extracted from the design. 
The deployment diagram developed for the FANS 
system includes four nodes (Figure 12): 
• The embedded system of the aircraft, 
• The first Air Tower Control, 
• The second Air Tower Control, and 
• The communication system, in fact its routing 
application. 
For prototyping purposes, the four execution nodes 
receive a network name which is the one of the 
computer on which the code is expected to be tested. 
For example, the “Aircraft” node is expected to run on 
a computer node called “neac”. 
The nodes are interconnected using UML links. The 
latter are enhanced with parameters: expected delay 
of the link, protocol used to send data on that link, 
and connections between synchronization gates. For 
example, when a class from the package 
“PkgAircraft” sends a data on the gate “wi_out”, that 
data is sent to the package PkgRouter using the UDP 
protocol to the destination port 6542 located on 
“orgnac”. 
 
The deployed packages have been built as follows, 
reusing classes defined at design stage: 
• PkgATC1 and PkgATC2 contain the 
ATCEmbeddedSystem class, and a Timer 
class. 
• PkgAircraft contains the 
AircraftEmbeddedSystem class, and a Timer 
class. 
• PkgRouter contains the 
CommunicationMedium class. 
 
To test that deployment, the Java code generator of 
TTool was activated using a press button approach. 
Once the code has been generated, it can be 
compiled using, e.g., the javac compiler provided by 
SUN. At last, the code can be executed on the 
computer mentioned in the deployment diagram. 
 
Figure 13 shows what happened when the first ATC, 
the Routing application, and the Aircraft were started. 
At first, the routing application, and then the ATC1 
are started. Then, the aircraft is started: it sends a 
Notification_Contact message to the Routing 
application, which forwards than message (UDP 
packet) to ATC1. ATC1 sends the response 
(Notification_Ack), and ask the Aircraft to contact 
ATC2 (Contact_Advisory). And so on. 
 
8. Conclusions  
The paper discusses an educational case study of 
protocol modeling using TURTLE, a real-time UML 
profile supported by the open-source toolkit TTool. 
The FANS system was selected to illustrate the 
TURTLE method and to highlight the set of features 
that makes TTool different from other UML tools. 
Examples include automatic synthesis of design 
diagrams from analysis ones, user-friendly access to 
complementary verification tools, formal verification of 
analysis diagrams prior to design diagrams definition, 
and automatic generation code from verified 
component and deployment diagrams. 
 
The TURTLE toolkit has evolved over the past six 
years. First wedding was between UML and the RT-
LOTOS process algebra. Second wedding interfaced 
the TURTLE toolkit with formal verification tools. 
Figure 12. Deployment diagram 
Third wedding linked TURTLE and rapid prototyping 
in Java. The last wedding was between SysML 
requirements and TURTLE. The story goes on with 
the tutorial presented in the paper. 
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